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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS OF 1992
The following is a compendium of major commu-
nications law decisions handed down by courts in the
United States in 1992.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES
Flagstaff Broadcasting Found. v. FCC, 972 F.2d
1566 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC") must give a rational reason for its ad-
herence to a particular policy when properly chal-
lenged in a specific case.
Holding.
The FCC is not only obligated to respond to a
broad challenge of the rationality of its integration
criterion( under Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873
(D.C. Cir. 1992)), but is also required to respond to
a petitioner's specific contentions that her proposal
will further the objectives of those criterion better
than her competitors. A petitioner is entitled to a
reasoned response to those claims, and is thus enti-
tled to more than a summary dismissal of her claims
after a cursory review of the history of the integra-
tion criterion.
Discussion:
Flagstaff Broadcasting Foundation's ("Founda-
tion") application to build a new FM radio station
in Flagstaff, Arizona, was denied. The FCC granted
the application of a competitor-Flagstaff Broadcast-
ing Partnership ("Partnership")-because it received
a 100 percent "integration" credit while Foundation
received no integration credit at all. Foundation's ap-
plication described the applicants-long-time resi-
dents of Flagstaff who were closely involved in that
community-as owners and managers who would
have exclusive responsibility for establishing station
policies, and would hire staff and experienced man-
agement-level personnel to implement those policies.
According to the FCC's integration rules, a station
owner is "integrated" into management when her in-
volvement amounts to full-time active participation
in day-to-day operations. The administrative law
judge ("ALJ") determined that Foundation's princi-
pals would not be "integrated" since they would
serve as directors rather than full-time managers.
The FCC's Review Board refused to set aside the
ALJ's decision, and Foundation applied for review
by the FCC. The FCC affirmed the decision without
considering the merits of Foundation's proposal. Its
explanation for the denial of Foundation's applica-
tion was that it did not consider the delegation of
management functions to employees the functional
equivalent of integration.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reviewed its decision
in Bechtel and determined that it required the FCC
to present evidence and reasoning to support its sub-
stantive rules, to respond to proper challenges and to
evaluate established policies over time. The court re-
affirmed Bechtel, finding that those duties attach not
only when an applicant accuses the agency of "irra-
tionality" but to all agency actions. The court found
that Foundation clearly sought review of the integra-
tion policy and had a firm basis for believing the
policy was unreasonable, despite the fact that Foun-
dation never claimed that the FCC was proceeding
"irrationally."
The court remanded the case to the FCC to afford
Foundation an opportunity to develop its position
and receive a full response from the FCC. Further,
it required the FCC to respond to Foundation's spe-
cific claim that its proposal would further the stated
objectives of the integration policy better than its
competitors.
CABLE SERVICES ISSUES
Beach Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1103
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 594
(1992).
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC") had a "rational basis" in justifying the
distinction between SMATV's treatment as a "cable
system" and the facilities exempted by the Cable
Definition Rule.
COURT DECISIONS
Holding-
The Cable Act is unconstitutional in part because
it violates the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment in that it requires local franchises
for external, quasi-private SMATV facilities and ex-
empts wholly private facilities from that
requirement.
Discussion:
This was the second time that this issue was
before the Court of Appeals (Beach Communications
v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1992)) ("Beach
I"). The petitioners operate external, quasi-private
SMATV facilities, where wires or other closed
transmission paths interconnect separately owned
and managed multi-unit dwellings, without those
wires using public rights-of-way. The Cable Defini-
tion Rule construes the statutory term "cable sys-
tem" to include such facilities, but excludes both ex-
ternal facilities (where wires do not interconnect
separate buildings or use public rights-of-way) and
wholly private facilities (where a single building or
group of commonly owned, controlled or managed
buildings are served, and the wires do not use public
rights-of-way). The Cable Act, section 621(b)(1), re-
quires the operator of a "cable system" to obtain a
local franchise. The petitioners challenged that re-
quirement on equal protection grounds.
In Beach I, the court held that the Cable Act
clearly defined an external, quasi-private SMATV
facility as a "cable system." The court also ruled
that this minimum-scrutiny issue was ripe, and
therefore remanded the record to the FCC to con-
sider whether there was a "rational basis" that justi-
fied the distinction between that type of facility and
facilities exempted by the Cable Definition Rule.
The court stressed that the equal protection issue
could not be avoided because the Cable Act clearly
excluded wholly private facilities from the definition
of a "cable system."
The FCC returned the record and, after review,
the court declared that the FCC failed to provide
any justification for the challenged distinction.
Therefore, the court ruled that the Cable Act is un-
constitutional in that it violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment, as it requires
franchise licenses for external, quasi-private facilities
and exempts wholly private facilities from that re-
quirement. Because neither type of facility uses pub-
lic rights-of-way (the main rationale for local
franchising), the court could conceive of no reason
why one should be subject to local franchising re-
quirements and the other exempt.
The majority of the court discussed Chief Judge
Mikva's suggestion that an external, quasi-private
facility is more similar to a traditional cable system
(Beach I, Mikva, C.J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgement). Without more, however,
that impression did not amount to a "rational basis."
The court found that there was no reasoned justifica-
tion of some public purpose, and that the FCC failed
to flesh out its reasons for the distinction or to sug-
gest some alternative rationale. The court was con-
vinced that the impression of "similarity" between
the facilities was just naked intuition, unsupported
by conceivable facts or policies.
As for a remedy, rather than conflict with congres-
sional intent by extending the definition of "cable
system" to cover wholly private facilities, the court
voided the franchise requirement as it covered peti-
tioners and similarly situated SMATV operators.
Because the Cable Act's severability provisions allow
for narrowly focused remedies, the court declared
that external, quasi-private SMATV facilities no
longer are required to obtain licenses pursuant to
section 621(b)(1) of the Cable Act and directed the
FCC to amend the Cable Act accordingly.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear
the case.
Cable Television Ass'n v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984's ("Cable Act") preemption clause extended to
state regulation of cable television downgrade
charges.
Holding-
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that fees charged by cable television
companies to downgrade customers to a less expen-
sive level of service may be regulated by the states.
The court concluded that the Cable Act's preemption
of state regulation of cable rates does not extend to
downgrade charges.
Discussion:
Cable companies make more money when sub-
scribers select premium service. It is a common in-
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dustry practice to waive installation fees for sub-
scribers who order premium service. In order to
prevent subscribers from downgrading to a lower tier
of service, cable companies charge substantial penal-
ties for downgrading from the premium service to a
lower tier of service. Downgrade charges are not
prohibited, but are regulated. In response to con-
sumer complaints, New York adopted regulations
limiting the ability of imposing downgrading
charges. The regulations stated that such charges
must be set at the company's actual cost and may
only be imposed if the customer seeks to downgrade
within six months of the initial subscription.
Under 47 U.S.C. § 543(a), regulations regarding
"rates for the provision of cable services" are subject
to preemption. The cable companies argued that
downgrading charges fit within the definition of
"rates for the provision of cable services," therefore
state regulation is preempted. The court rejected this
argument, stating that classifying downgrading as a
provision of services requires a tortured reading of
the statute. In reading the provision in a common
sense fashion, the court reasoned that the provision
applied to enhancing service and not reducing it.
Such a reading, the court held, comports with the
original purpose of section 453 to allow market
forces to control the rates charged by cable
companies.
The court further rejected the argument that, even
if downgrade charges in themselves do not fit under
section 543, the New York regulations are still pre-
empted because they affect other rates which are
governed by section 543. The court stated that any
impact on rates is too "indirect" to allow the conclu-
sion that Congress intended to preempt regulation
extending to downgrade charges.
Scofield v. Tele~able of Overland Park, 973 F.2d
874 (10th Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether the subscriber privacy notices ("SPNs")
issued by Tele~able were sufficiently clear so as to
satisfy section 551 of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable Act").
Holding
The court reviewed TeleCable's SPNs in light of
the five guidelines of section 551(a)(1) and held that
both forms of the SPNs adequately satisfied the
guidelines found in subsections (A)-(E).
Discussion:
TeleCable appealed from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas ruling, which held that its
SPNs failed to comply with the guidelines estab-
lished by the subscriber privacy notice provisions of
section 551 of the Cable Act.
The plaintiffs below challenged the adequacy of
two different forms of SPNs issued by TeleCable, by
conceding that while the alleged faulty notices did
not cause any actual harm, the violation of the notice
provisions as the source of their injury.
Section 551 of the Cable Act established a self-
contained and privately enforceable scheme for the
protection of cable subscriber privacy. It regulates
four types of cable company practices involving per-
sonally identifiable information. It limits a com-
pany's ability to use its system to peer in on the
cable viewer and collect personally identifiable infor-
mation (such as the subscriber's viewing habits), and
limits the types of third party disclosures that can be
made of the information which a cable company has
collected. Additionally, it requires that cable opera-
tors provide subscribers access to personally identifi-
able information collected and maintained by the
company, and it mandates that operators destroy
personally identifiable information that is no longer
necessary for the purpose for which it was collected.
Finally, section 551 establishes a set of subscriber
notice requirements, whereby the operator is re-
quired to provide its subscribers with a privacy no-
tice when they first subscribe, and once every year
thereafter. The notice must clearly and conspicu-
ously inform the subscriber of five specific pieces of
information.
In the case at hand, Telecable's system was a non-
interactive "one way" system, and therefore Tele-
Cable could not utilize the cable system for collecting
personally identifiable information concerning its
subscribers. The only information which TeleCable
collected was the information that the subscriber fur-
nished or that TeleCable maintained in the ordinary
course of business. TeleCable had no written policy
regarding the retention and destruction of subscriber
information. Generally, it would keep such informa-
tion on its electronic data base for as long as it pro-
vided services.
With regard to disclosure of subscriber informa-
tion to third parties, TeleCable generally did not re-
lease subscriber names and addresses or other infor-
mation to any third party, except in connection with
rendering cable services.
Plaintiff's asserted that TeleCable's notices were
neither "clear and conspicuous" nor "meaningful"
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because their notices were too broad and vague to
provide a subscriber any meaningful understanding
of TeleCable's practices.
The court stated that it intended to adopt a com-
mon sense approach rather than a technical ap-
proach in determining what is required for a notice
to be "clear and conspicuous" and "meaningful."
The court first turned to the Federal Truth in Lend-
ing Guidelines for guidance, and held that the dis-
closure should at least be such that the subscriber
"could reasonably be expected to have . . . under-
stood its meaning." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(j). Second, the
court considered the statute's aim of protecting sub-
scriber privacy, and noted that the legislative history
indicated that Congress was chiefly concerned with
the privacy implications of two-way systems. Finally,
the court noted that when determining whether a
disclosure meets the "clear and conspicuous" and
"meaningful" requirements of section 551, a disclos-
ure will not fail simply because a superior or more
detailed statement could have been provided. The
question was whether the disclosure offered was suf-
ficiently clear for purposes of the statute. The court
reviewed TeleCable's notices in light of the five
guidelines of section 551(a)(1), and held that both
forms of the privacy notices adequately satisfied the
guidelines found in subsections (A)-(E).
Shurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 71 Rad. Reg.
2d (P&F) 693 (1992).
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC") adequately justified its decision to re-
vise the network financial interest and syndication
rules.
Holding:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit vacated the FCC's 1991 financial syndication
rules and stayed the decision for 120 days.
Discussion:
The three-judge panel determined that the FCC
failed to justify and articulate the basis for the new
rules restricting network participation in ownership
and syndication of programming. Judge Posner,
writing for the court, called the FCC's action "arbi-
trary and capricious" and noted that "key concepts
are left unexplained, key evidence is overlooked."
While the FCC defended the restrictions on the
ground that they promote programming diversity, it
made no attempt to explain how it arrived at such a
conclusion.
COMMON CARRIER ISSUES
Am. Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
Issues-
Whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC") was properly acting in its discretion in
interpreting the Communications Act of 1934
("Communications Act") by dismissing a party's
complaint alleging that a nondominant carrier was
charging some customers rates that were not filed
with the FCC.
Whether the FCC's reliance on an "enforcement
policy" in its dismissal of a carrier's complaint,
while postponing a decision on the substantive valid-
ity of the policy until a future prospective rulemak-
ing, was proper under the Act.
Holding-
When presented with a common carrier's com-
plaint alleging violations of section 203 of the Com-
munications Act, the FCC has an obligation to an-
swer the questions raised and decide whether a
competing carrier has violated the statute. It is arbi-
trary and capricious for the agency to dismiss such a
complaint without determining whether a carrier has
violated the Act, and ostensibly without addressing
the validity of an FCC order on which the carrier
had relied to justify its actions.
Discussion:
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
("AT&T") challenged MCI Telecommunications
Corp.'s ("MCI") use of rates that were not filed
with the FCC, entering a complaint seeking a cease
and desist order and monetary damages. MCI relied
on the FCC's Fourth Report, which extended the
FCC's policy of permissive detariffing treatment for
"specialized carriers" like MCI. The FCC did not
act on the complaint within the statutory period, but
when AT&T's mandamus petition was filed twenty-
five months after the complaint had been filed, it
concluded that the Fourth Report was a substantive
rule on which MCI had properly relied. It reserved
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a decision on the validity of the Fourth Report for a
rulemaking procedure which it instituted the same
day.
The court found that AT&T did not request a
new rulemaking, and that the Commission-as an
adjudicator asked to apply existing law to a com-
plaint-thus had an obligation to respond to the is-
sues raised by the complaint. At a minimum, the
court found, AT&T was entitled to a cease and de-
sist order when it raised the question of whether or
not MCI had been, and currently was, violating the
law.
The court found that the FCC's implicit approval
of the Fourth Report in its decision was improper.
The Report allowed permissive detariffing treatment
of carriers, which the court found exceeded the lim-
ited authority granted the FCC in section 203(b) to
"modify" requirements of the Communications Act.
The court vacated the Fourth Report, stating that
the FCC must have congressional approval for the
policy contained therein. It remanded AT&T's claim
for relief to the FCC for reconsideration of its denial
of a cease and desist order and the damages claim.
Am. Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC, 974 F.2d 1351
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC"), in issuing a Reconsideration Order
that was ostensibly a clarification of a previous order
establishing the price cap system, had to offer an ex-
planation for this perceived modification of previous
policy.
Holding-
If the FCC decides to exclude promotional rates
from average price calculations, it must provide an
adequate explanation for doing so. If it decides that
its action in issuing a Reconsideration Order consti-
tutes a change in the original price cap rules, it must
offer a reasoned explanation of why promotional
rates should be treated differently from other rates.
Discussion:
American Telephone and Telegraph Co.
("AT&T") challenged an order amending the aver-
age price cap rate regulation policy of the FCC.
AT&T sought to have promotional rates considered
along with various business and individual rates for
purposes of averaging for determination of whether
the company's rates fell within the established rate
cap ceiling. Proposed rate changes under current
regulations that push a bundle or "basket" rate price
index above the cap face stringent FCC scrutiny-a
difficult showing. MCI argued that the short-term
price reductions sought to be included by AT&T
should be excluded from the average rate
calculations.
In the FCC's Reconsideration Order, it deter-
mined that promotional pricing should generally not
be credited in price index calculations. It then
amended its regulations to exclude the promotional
rates from the price cap index schema.
The D.C. Circuit found that the FCC had ample
opportunity to consider AT&T's claim that the Re-
consideration Order was a rulemaking in the dis-
guise of a clarification. It noted that the FCC failed
to cite any ambiguity in the original Price Cap order
or its resulting rules that raised questions concerning
the proper treatment of promotional rates under that
order. The court remanded the decision to the FCC
to allow it to provide an adequate explanation for
excluding the promotional rates or to adequately ex-
plain why promotional rates should be treated differ-
ently from other rates.
Barasch v. Bell Tel. Co., 605 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1992).
Issue:
Whether "CallerID" service was legal under the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Code.
Holding:
The court held that CallerID service violates the
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil-
lance Control Act, 18 P.S.C. §§ 5701-5781, and
cannot be offered in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
Discussion:
In January 1989 the Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania ("Pennsylvania Bell") proposed a
tariff revision that included CallerID service. Cal-
lerID is an optional service that allows a called party
to determine the phone number from which a call is
made. Subscribers to the service, who generally pay
a monthly fee, require a device that will display or
store the calling number. The tariff included no op-
tions that permitted a calling party to block the
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transmission of his number, either on a per-call or
per-line basis.
After receiving complaints against the proposed
service, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
("PUC") suspended that portion of the tariff and as-
signed the matter to an administrative law judge
("ALJ"). The ALJ determined that CallerID con-
stituted a "trap and trace device," defined by the
state Wiretap Act, and therefore was per se unjust
and unreasonable under the state's Public Utility
Code. He concluded that regardless of any violation
of the Wiretap Act, CallerID service without any
blocking provision is not in the public interest.
The PUC rejected the AL's decision and voted to
allow CallerID virtually without restriction or pro-
tection for callers. Blocking options would be made
available only to such entities as domestic abuse shel-
ters, law enforcement agencies, or those individuals
"certified" by law enforcement to be at risk of some
personal harm. CallerID blocking options were not
given to the general public.
The Office of Consumer Advocate and the Penn-
sylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence ap-
plied for a partial stay of the PUC's decision with
the Commonwealth Court. Judge Crumlish of that
court granted the stay, and ordered that only emer-
gency service providers could be offered CallerID
until resolution of the appeal.
The Commonwealth Court held that CallerID as
proposed did in fact violate the Pennsylvania Wire-
tap Act, and it further found that PUC's approval of
the service violated a citizen's right to privacy guar-
anteed by the state constitution. Moreover, the ma-
jority contended even with blocking options the ser-
vice would be unlawful and unconstitutional. The
PUC and Pennsylvania Bell appealed to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
Commonwealth Court's decision that CallerID vio-
lates the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. It declined to
determine whether the service was unconstitutional,
reiterating that courts should not decide a constitu-
tional issue when the decision can properly be based
on non-constitutional grounds. The court also noted
that whether CallerID with a blocking option would
be allowable was not an issue before it.
The Pennsylvania Wiretap Act defines a trap and
trace device, 18 P.C.S. § 5702, as one that "captures
the incoming electronic or other impulses which
identify the originating number" of a communicating
device. The use of trap and trace devices is generally
prohibited, 18 P.S.C. § 5771, unless a court order
permits it. The court determined that those prohibi-
tions embraced CallerID; it needed next to resolve
whether CallerID was covered by an exception to
section 5771.
The appellants argued that CallerID fell under
the exception that allows a "provider of electronic or
wire communication service" to use a trap and trace
device if it obtained the consent of the user. Pennsyl-
vania Bell argued that it, and not the subscriber,
captured the calling party's number, and that as an
electronic service provider Pennsylvania Bell may le-
gally "trap" that information. The supreme court
stated that CallerID "almost certainly is not" solely
a function of the telephone company, and neverthe-
less maintained that the analysis did not end there.
The Pennsylvania Wiretap Act allows lawful in-
terception of communications where all parties have
given prior consent. The court noted that both the
calling party and the CallerID subscriber are users
of the telephone network, and in particular, it is the
calling party "whose number is being trapped and
traced and whose privacy is being jeopardized, and
whose 'consent' would therefore be particularly rele-
vant." In addition, the court pointed to the fact that
although Pennsylvania and federal wiretap laws
were nearly the same, the state's general assembly
adopted legislation more protective of individual
rights. In those limited instances where the legisla-
ture would permit consent of only one party in inter-
cepting a call, it specifically stated so in the statute.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined this
was not one of those instances.
[Note: In September 1991, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") adopted a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), CC Docket 91-
281, regarding calling number identification services,
or caller ID, on an interstate basis. After noting that
several technical, regulatory and legal issues existed,
the FCC concluded that "interstate caller ID is in
the public interest and that [the FCC] should adopt
a national policy ... in order to remove undesirable
barriers to the efficient entry of the service into the
marketplace." The FCC anticipated that it would
assess coordination of federal and state policy after
interstate policy was established.
In its discussion on the privacy concerns of caller
ID, the FCC recognized the conflict between the
called party's desire to "see who is knocking" before
allowing a caller to "telephonically enter" his prem-
ises and the calling party's preference for anonymity.
The FCC tentatively concluded that the privacy of
both parties should be protected, and that any regu-
latory framework should include a reasonable block-
ing mechanism.
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The NPRM addressed the possibility that caller
ID may violate the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-3127, and noted that the FCC would for-
mally solicit an analysis from the United States De-
partment of Justice on the issue. The FCC stated
that Congress did not preclude more restrictive state
laws in adopting the federal wiretap statute; the
FCC was to solicit an opinion from the Department
of Justice on whether the FCC had the authority to
preempt state law in that regard.
This NPRM was adopted while Barasch was still
on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and
it addressed the Commonwealth Court's decision as
directly impeding the development of interstate ser-
vices. While the FCC sought to determine whether
state policies might hinder or negate an interstate
caller ID system, the NPRM tentatively concluded
that "it is not necessary at this time to propose to
preempt any intrastate caller ID offerings."
In a separate statement, Commissioner Ervin S.
Duggan recognized the marvels of technology, but
wondered whether a more general privacy interest
should be considered. He suggested a careful consid-
eration of personal privacy at this time "in order to
protect the public's interest in the future."
The reply comment period for the NPRM con-
cluded February 5, 1992. At the time of this writing,
the FCC had taken no action on this matter.]
Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 825 P.2d 588 (Nev.
1992).
Issue:
Whether a competitive telephone service provider
was liable for delay and problems resulting from in-
stallation of service.
Holding
Without a showing of fraud, a service provider is
only liable up to the cost of the service itself.
Discussion:
A distributor of light bulbs sued Nevada Bell al-
leging breach of contract, breach of warranty and in-
tentional misrepresentation resulting from time con-
suming installation and subsequent problems with a
Centrex system. In affirming the lower court's deci-
sion granting partial summary judgment to Nevada
Bell, the Nevada Supreme Court exempted Nevada
Bell from liability under its Nevada Public Service
Commission tariff no. A2, holding liability only up
to the charges for installation and provision of the
actual service in question. Although it found Centrex
to be a competitive service, the court refused to find
the Centrex service exempt from the language of the
tariff. While fraud would serve to take Nevada Bell's
actions out of the limited liability of the tariff, repre-
sentations of installation time and cost to customer
were deemed estimates and "puffing" and hence in-
sufficient to be actionable.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n., 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 1992).
Issue:
Whether a factual hearing was required to deter-
mine whether extraordinary nonforseeable expenses
on revenues were an exception to the prohibition for
retroactive rate-making.
Whether the authorized rate of return imposed an
absolute legal ceiling on a telephone company's
profits.
Holding
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the Public
Service Commission of Utah's ("PSC") failure to
hold a factual hearing on issue of telephone com-
pany's misconduct for failing to properly disclose
earnings information was arbitrary and capricious
and that the authorized rate of return did not impose
an absolute ceiling on the telephone company's
profits.
Discussion:
The PSC denied MCI's request to investigate a
telephone company's rate of return after reduction in
federal income tax from the Tax Reform Act of
1986.
In 1985, the PSC granted Mountain States Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., now U.S. West Corpora-
tion, a $22 million general rate increase and estab-
lished 14.2 percent as its authorized rate of return on
equity. In granting the increase, PSC assumed that
U.S. West would pay a federal corporate income tax
of 46 percent. In 1986, Congress enacted the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, which amounted to a reduction
in U.S. West's federal corporate income tax liability
from 46 to 34 percent. In December 1986, the PSC
requested that the major utilities in the state provide
it with information showing the anticipated effect of
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the reduced income tax rates on their earnings.
The PSC requested that the Utah Division of
Public Utilities ("Division") review the responses of
the companies. The Division recommended that the
PSC not order U.S. West to reduce its rates. How-
ever, the Division's conclusions appeared to be in er-
ror. U.S. West's actual rate returns exceeded its au-
thorized rate of return. In fact, its rate of return
increased dramatically after the first phase of the tax
reduction became effective. Therefore, over a period
of approximately two years, the PSC entered three
orders reducing U.S. West's rates.
In the interim, a U.S. West ratepayer filed a re-
quest for agency action asking the PSC to investigate
U.S. West's rate of return, and to order U.S. West to
refund to the ratepayers all earnings exceeding the
14.2 percent authorized rate of return. The PSC de-
nied the relief sought by the request, ruling that it
had no authority to order a refund because a refund
would constitute retroactive rate-making in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1).
The court explained that as a general proposition,
a utility's recoupment of costs that were greater than
projected from future rates constituted retroactive
rate-making. The prohibition against retroactive
rate-making is designed to provide utilities with an
incentive to operate efficiently. However, a number
of courts have recognized the exception for unfore-
seeable and extraordinary increases in a utility's ex-
penses. Increased expenses from natural disasters
and other extraordinary events are the typical bases
for the exception. The exception has been applied
not only to unforeseeable and extraordinary in-
creases in expenses, but also to unforeseeable and ex-
traordinary decreases in expenses.
The court stated that the PSC failed to specifically
state whether there was an exception for unforesee-
able and extraordinary expenses, and failed to allow
petitioners a factual hearing on whether the excep-
tion applied. The court held that the exception for
unforeseeable and extraordinary increases or de-
creases in expenses is recognized in Utah, and that
the PSC's refusal to allow a factual hearing was er-
ror. On remand, it directed the PSC to make a fac-
tual finding on all relevant issues, and at a mini-
mum, the findings were to include: U.S. West's
earnings and rate of return, the extent to which
those earnings exceeded the authorized rate of re-
turn, the amount of the decrease in U.S. West's fed-
eral income tax, and whether U.S. West was cooper-
ative, accurate and forthright in the information
provided and representations made to PSC and the
Division.
The court further stated that if a utility earned
profits in excess of its authorized rate of return be-
cause of an exception to the rule against retroactive
rate making, the authorized rate was the best availa-
ble measure of a fair return, and earnings in excess
of that rate were subject to refund. Therefore, if on
remand, U.S. West was found to have engaged in
misconduct, or if the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was
found to have resulted in an unforeseeable and ex-
traordinary decrease in expenses, then U.S. West's
earnings, to the extent they exceeded its authorized
rate of return, were to be refunded to the U.S. West
ratepayers, either by way of reparations, a refund or
a credit against future rates.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma, 825 P.2d
262 (Okl. 1992).
Issue:
Whether the rate ordered by the Commission was
contrary to law because it was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
Holding:
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that sub-
stantial evidence supported the Commission's order.
Discussion:
In October 1986, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company ("SWB") applied to the Oklahoma Cor-
poration Commission ("Commission"), requesting
changes and additions to its Access Service Tariff
and its Wide Area Telecommunications Service
("WATS") Plan Tariff for the purpose of adding
800 access that would allow interexchange carriers
other than AT&T Communications of the South-
west, Inc, ("AT&T") to offer 800 calling. At a
Commission hearing, all parties, with the exception
of AT&T signed a stipulation agreeing on an in-
terim rate of $.276 per minute for the intraLATA
800 portion of the service. After the hearing, the
Commission prescribed the rate of $.192 per minute
of use as the amount that interexchange carriers
could be charged by the local exchange carriers on
non-joint interstate intraLATA 800 calls. Addition-
ally, the Commission ordered the local exchange
companies to collect data for review by the Commis-
sion in eighteen months.
SWB, AT&T and MCI maintained that the rate
ordered by the Commission was contrary to law be-
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cause it was not supported by substantial evidence.
SWB argued that the rate set by the Commission
was too low, and AT&T and MCI both alleged that
the rate was too high.
The court stated that to decide whether the Com-
mission's order was supported by substantial evi-
dence, it must determine whether the rate was "rea-
sonable and just."
Through legislative enactment, the Commission
has the authority to order rates which allow a "fair
return" on the value of property used in providing
service to the citizens. A determination of the fair re-
turn on the value of property is a prerequisite in de-
termining whether a rate is reasonable and just. The
recommendations which were adopted by the Com-
mission were based upon the premise that the local
exchange companies should have their revenues re-
placed according to the amount they would make if
they offered the service instead of the interexchange
carriers.
The court held that the Commission properly bal-
anced the interests of the local exchange companies,
the interexchange companies and the using public in
determining the rates. A review of the record re-
vealed substantial evidence to support the order of
the Commission, and the order of the Commission
was therefore affirmed.
Union Tel. Co., Inc. v. Wyoming Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 833 P.2d 473 (Wyo. 1992).
Issue:
A cellular carrier challenged an order of the Wyo-
ming Public Service Commission ("PSC"), which set
compensation rates for the operation of cellular tele-
communications services.
Holding-
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the
PSC's determination that a cellular carrier was not
entitled to mutual compensation for interconnection
with local exchange service was arbitrary and capri-
cious and not supported by substantial evidence.
Discussion:
Union Telephone is an independent telephone
company certificated by the PSC to provide exclusive
local exchange telephone service in two Wyoming
counties. It recently obtained a license from the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC") to oper-
ate an exclusive cellular telecommunications service
in an area much larger than its certificated local ex-
change area. The portion of Union Telephone which
would operate its cellular services is know as Union
Cellular.
In order to provide its cellular customers with ac-
cess to customers of U.S. West and other indepen-
dent telephone companies, Union Cellular sought to
interconnect its cellular facilities with U.S. West's
landline network. U.S. West provides certificated lo-
cal exchange service in service areas throughout the
state of Wyoming. Union Cellular proposed a
unique interconnection arrangement which would al-
low it, by using U.S. West's public-switched net-
work, to avoid constructing many additional facilities
to handle the cellular traffic. U.S. West consented to
the proposed interconnection plan, but the parties
could not agree how the arrangement should be
priced.
The PSC held hearings at which all parties
presented testimony. The PSC subsequently issued a
memorandum, and authorized the compensation plan
endorsed by U.S. West. Union Telephone then filed
a petition for review.
The court addressed the standard for review, stat-
ing that under Vandehei Developers v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1990), the court
shall "examine the decision of the administrative
agency as if [it] were the reviewing court of the first
instance. Furthermore, under Palmer v. Bd. of
Trustees of Crook County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 785
P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1990), "in reaching a determina-
tion with respect to whether the factual decision of
an administrative agency is arbitrary and capricious,
the standard is that we review the entire record and
determine whether the decision can be supported by
evidence found in that record."
In its analysis, the court first noted the PSC re-
fused Union Cellular's mutual compensation in part
because it found that its proposed interconnection did
not fall in to the traditional categories of Type 1,
Type 2 or Type 2A interconnections. The type of
interconnection is significant because of an FCC de-
cision concerning interconnection arrangements with
cellular carriers. However, the court held that the
FCC decision was not binding because the FCC only
has jurisdiction over interstate interconnection
charges, and this arrangement dealt with intrastate
connections. However, the court noted that the
"FCC scheme is powerful, persuasive authority for
the concept that the party which switches a call, be it
a cellular or landline carrier, should be compensated
for the switching expenses it incurs." The court
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stated that the testimony revealed that, although
there were some differences between Union Cellu-
lar's proposed interconnection, the agreement had
Type 2 characteristics, and therefore the rationale
for Type 2 status was present. The court held that
the reasons given for refusing to recognize the Type
2 status of the interconnection did not support the
decision made. Therefore, the PSC's decision on that
point was arbitrary and capricious and not sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
Another of the PSC's stated reasons for denying
mutual compensation was that Union Cellular's use
of U.S. West's facilities should not burden U.S.
West's local customers. However, the court stated
that the U.S. West subscriber would be responsible
for increased rates only for those calls he or she
made to Union Cellular customers, and the U.S.
West subscribers were free to place those calls. It
was therefore erroneous to characterize the arrange-
ment as a subsidy or burden on the U.S. West
subscribers.
Finally, the PSC's primary reason for denying
Union Cellular's mutual compensation was that
Union Cellular's operations were not equivalent to
those of a local exchange character. The court ac-
knowledged that other state's utility commissions
have generally denied mutual compensation to cellu-
lar carriers for intrastate interconnection. However,
the court disagreed with the position taken by these
state commissions for three reasons. First, there was
no logical reason for distinguishing between inter-
state interconnection arrangements, for which mu-
tual compensation must be paid, and intrastate ar-
rangements, for which it need not be. The policy of
paying a carrier its switching costs is the same in
both circumstances. Second, the benefit of intercon-
nection did not accrue disproportionately to the cel-
lular customer when he receives a call placed by a
U.S. West subscriber. Finally, the public interest fa-
vored payment of access charges to Union Cellular,
and the primary concern of the PSC was to see that
the public interest was met. Although Union Cellu-
lar was not a provider of last resort nor a local ex-
change carrier, it was certificated to provide cellular
service to the public within its service area. To make
such a service worthwhile and affordable to the pub-
lic, interconnection with U.S. West's landline was
desirable if not crucial, and a necessary corollary to
interconnection is payment of its costs to the utility
which incurs them.
Therefore, the court held that the PSC's determi-
nation that Union Cellular was not entitled to mu-
tual compensation was arbitrary and capricious, and
was not supported by substantial evidence. Because
the PSC's determination led to an unjust and unrea-
sonable result, the case was remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F. 2d 1231
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether the FCC waiver should have been evalu-
ated under the more permissive test for unopposed
decree modifications-i.e., would the requested
waiver be "certain to lessen competition."
Holding-
The waiver of the AT&T consent decree to permit
centralized provision of the "signaling" component of
long distance telephone calls was properly deter-
mined under the standard set forth in section VIII(c)
of the decree-whether the proposal "presents no
substantial possibility of impeding competition."
Discussion:
This case, as the culmination of the government's
antitrust suit against the "Bell System," addresses
the Bell Operating Company's ("BOC") argument
that their common channel signaling ("CCS")
waiver should be granted. The BOC's and the De-
partment of Justice ("DoJ") argued that the waiver
request does not substantially implicate the consent
decree's line-of-business restrictions and therefore
the standard to determine whether it should be
granted is not the potentially demanding section
VIII(c) test but rather the more relaxed public inter-
est test embodied in section VII. Alternatively, the
appellants maintained that the applicability of sec-
tion VIII(c) turns on the position of the DoJ-the
plaintiff and "prime mover" in the antitrust case un-
derlying the decree. The district court held that the
waiver proposal did not satisfy the section VIII(c)
test.
On appeal, the court found that the CCS waiver
would not merely change the details of existing ex-
change access service, but would allow the BOC's to
expand their monopolies over exchange access into a
slice of the competitive interexchange services mar-
ket. It stated that such a modification requiring a
change in a line-of-business restriction is, if con-
tested, governed by the section VIII(c) test. The
court could not find any precedent applying a varia-
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ble standard to judge a suggested modification of
general language of a decree, depending on which
party objects. The court stated that it did not think
that the BOC's could be allowed to opportunistically,
after so much litigation involving the same parties,
switch their position and challenge the proposition
that AT&T's position on a proposed line-of-business
modification could be determinative of whether the
section VIII(c) test applies. Judge Williams, in dis-
sent, suggested that the district court had not yet ap-
plied the correct standard, and would have remanded
the case for that purpose.
COPYRIGHT ISSUES
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429
(6th Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether rap group 2 Live Crew's parody of "Oh,
Pretty Woman" was fair use.
Holding-
The court of appeals held that 2 Live Crew's par-
ody of the 1964 hit "Oh, Pretty Woman" was not
fair use within the meaning of section 107 of the
Copyright Act.
Discussion:
The court determined that several factors weighed
against a finding of fair use: the for-profit nature of
the 2 Live Crew work; the creative nature of the
Roy Orbison work; and the fact that 2 Live Crew's
copying was "qualitatively substantial." The court
presumed a likelihood of future harm to the copy-
right holder because of the commercial nature of the
parody.
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc.,
954 F.2d 1419 (1992).
Issue:
Whether plaintiff's 2000 plus radio receivers, each
with two attached speakers and each operated in a
different store, qualified for the homestyle exemption
embodied in 17 U.S.C. §110(5).
Holding-
The circuit court affirmed the district court's deci-
sion to grant summary judgment in favor of Edison
Brothers Stores, Inc. ("Edison"), in Edison's suit for
declaratory judgment that its stores qualify for an
exemption from the vesting of exclusive rights of
performance in the owners of copyrighted works.
Discussion:
Relying on the plain language of the statute, the
court found that it is not appropriate to focus on the
number of stores involved but rather on whether
each store duplicates the requirements of the homes-
tyle exception. Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") pro-
vided no evidence that Edison's unlicensed stores did
not meet the statutory criteria for entitlement to the
section 110(5) exemption. The court also found that
the size of the store in question is also not a decisive
factor, nor does the statute require that the entity's
ability to pay for a commercial background music
service be considered. Finally the court did not find
the district court's holding to be inconsistent with ei-
ther the purpose of the Copyright Act or to be in
conflict with the United States' adherence to the
Berne Convention.
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
In Re Andrew Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether reporters had a qualified privilege under
the First Amendment against being compelled to tes-
tify about matters learned during interviews.
Holding
Reporters did not have a qualified privilege under
the First Amendment against being compelled to tes-
tify about matters learned during interviews.
Discussion:
In mid-1990, four reporters interviewed a South
Carolina legislator who claimed that he had received
no more than $300 from Ronald L. Cobb as a legal
donation to his reelection campaign. One year later,
after the legislator was indicted for accepting $2,800
from Cobb to vote for a bill before the South Caro-
lina Senate, the U.S. Government subpoenaed the
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aforementioned reporters to have them testify about
the statements that they had reported. At the trial,
the reporters refused to testify on the grounds that
the First Amendment afforded them a qualified priv-
ilege against being compelled to testify concerning
newsgathering. The U.S. District Court found the
reporters in contempt, and they appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court.
Chief Judge Hawkins wrote that the "incidental
burden" on the freedom of the press in this case did
not necessitate the invalidation of the subpoenas is-
sued to the reporters. Moreover, the appellate court
stated that, absent evidence of government harass-
ment or bad faith, the reporters had "no privilege
different from that of any other citizen not to testify
about knowledge relevant to a criminal prosecution."
The court pointed out that the reporters had con-
ceded that neither the legislator's identity nor his
statements during the interview were confidential.
Hence, the court of appeals concluded that the dis-
trict court had properly held the reporters in con-
tempt for refusing to testify.
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
Issue
Whether two newspapers of national circulation
could use the musical act, New Kids on the Block, as
subjects of public opinion polls.
Holding
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to defendants.
Discussion:
The two newspapers independently conducted
polls of their readers using 900 numbers to obtain
responses to the question of who was the most popu-
lar member of the singing group New Kids on the
Block. New Kids on the Block sued the newspapers
for, among other things, trademark infringement, vi-
olation of the Lanham Act, false advertising and un-
fair competition, misappropriation, and intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage.
The newspapers moved for summary judgment, ar-
guing that conducting polls fell under the purview of
"news-gathering activities" and thus was protected
under the First Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New
York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct 501
(1991).
Issue.
Whether New York's "Son of Sam" law, prohibit-
ing an author from financially profiting from a book
written about his criminal actions, was valid under
the First Amendment.
Holding-
New York's "Son of Sam" law was inconsistent
with the First Amendment because it singled out
speech on a particular subject for a financial burden
that was not levied on any other speech or income.
Discussion:
The "Son of Sam" law required that persons con-
tracting with an accused or convicted person for a
depiction of the crime supply the New York State
Crime Victim's Board ("Board") with a copy of the
contract, and divert all payments for the depiction to
the Board, for the benefit of the victim.
In 1986, the Board learned that Simon & Schuster
had contracted for the rights to the life story of the
admitted organized crime figure, Henry Hill. Hill
had signed a publishing agreement for the rights to
the story "Wiseguy" which later became the basis
for the popular film, "Goodfellas." The Board deter-
mined that "Wiseguy" was covered by the "Son of
Sam" law and ordered Simon & Schuster to turn
over the contract and suspend all future payments to
Hill.
Simon & Schuster brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for a declaratory judgment that the "Son of
Sam" law violated the First Amendment. The Su-
preme Court stated that the law singled out income
derived from an expressive activity about a specific
subject to bear a financial disincentive, and as such
constituted an impermissible burden on speech.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct 2538
(1992).
Issue:
Whether the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Or-
dinance, which prohibits the display of a symbol
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which one knows or has reason to know will "arouse
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender," was valid
under the First Amendment.
Holding
The ordinance was determined to be facially inva-
lid under the First Amendment.
Discussion:
Petitioner, who was arrested for burning a cross
on the yard of a black family, was charged with vio-
lating the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the
ordinance was substantially overbroad and imper-
missibly content-based, and therefore invalid under
the First Amendment.
In holding that the ordinance was facially invalid
under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
noted that the ordinance did not limit its restrictions
merely to "fighting words," which constitutes pros-
cribable speech, but to fighting words that insult or
provoke violence "on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender." Displays containing abusive in-
vective, regardless of how vicious or severe, were
permissible unless they were directed at one of the
specified disfavored topics.
The Court stated that the First Amendment does
not permit a state to impose special prohibitions on
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. It
found that the ordinance went beyond mere content
discrimination to actual viewpoint discrimination.
Wilson v. University of Texas Health Center, 973
F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether a public employee was protected under
the First Amendment when making internal reports
concerning sexual harassment at the work place.
Holding
Reports of sexual harassment are of great public
concern and a public employee has First Amendment
protection when she makes a statement both as an
employee and as a citizen.
Discussion:
Wilson was a police officer of the University of
Texas Health Center ("UTHC"), who made several
written reports concerning sexual harassment toward
herself and other UTHC employees by other police
officers. The court held that the content of the re-
ports was of great public concern and that Wilson
made her reports as both a citizen and an employee.
The court in applying the U.S. Supreme Court case
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) held that the
First Amendment protection exists for speech that is
made both as an employee and as a citizen.
MASS MEDIA ISSUES
Edge Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 956 F.2d 263 (4th
Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC") could properly bar a radio station
from airing advertisements for an out-of-state lottery,
if that station is located in a state that prohibits
lotteries.
Holding-
Application of federal regulations that restricted a
North Carolina radio station from broadcasting com-
mercials for an out-of-state lottery were
unconstitutional.
Discussion:
Under federal regulations contained in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1304 and 1307, no radio station may broadcast
lottery commercials unless that station is located in a
state that conducts its own lottery. WMYK, operated
by Edge Broadcasting Corporation ("Edge") from
studios in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, served
primarily southern counties in the neighboring state
of Virginia. Since WMYK was licensed in North
Carolina, a non-lottery state, the station faced possi-
ble revocation of its license for carrying advertise-
ments about the Virginia lottery.
Edge brought an action in U.S. District Court
challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1304 and 1307. The lower court held that appli-
cation of the foregoing statutory sections to WYMK
represented a constitutionally invalid restriction on
commercial speech. From that order, the FCC
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appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court. According to Judge Kaufman, the commer-
cials that WYMK sought to broadcast were not mis-
leading but, rather, concerned a lawful activity (i.e.,
the Virginia lottery). Furthermore, the appellate
court noted that restricting WMYK from advertising
the Virginia lottery would not advance the underly-
ing purpose of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1307, which
was to discourage gambling in non-lottery states. Af-
ter all, the North Carolina residents which the stat-
ute purported to protect were already exposed to
Virginia lottery information through television and
the print media, the court stated.
Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether or not women, as a class, deserved pref-
erence in the comparative licensing process of the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") so
as to increase program diversity.
Holding-
The FCC policy of awarding extra-credit to
women who apply for permission to build radio sta-
tions was in violation of the U.S. Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause.
Discussion:
The issue of preferences for ethnic and racial mi-
norities continues to evolve. The Supreme Court's
decision in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct.
2997 (1990), upheld the FCC methods for preferring
applicants on the basis of race, ethnicity or surname.
But the court expressly refused to rule on the FCC
policy of preferring applicants on the basis of sex.
The issue of gender based preferences, held in abey-
ance until the Supreme Court ruling in Metro, was
squarely before this panel of the Court of Appeals.
This case began in 1982 when three parties filed
mutually exclusive applications to build a radio sta-
tion out of Middletown, Maryland. The administra-
tive law judge ("ALJ") reviewing the applications
gave a female applicant an enhanced score because of
her sex, thereby causing her to be placed first. Los-
ing applicant Jerome Lamprecht appealed to the
Court of Appeals for review, arguing that the FCC's
sex-preference policy violated the Communications
Act of 1934 and the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment. Concluding that the FCC was
within the parameters of the Communications Act,
the court then turned to the Constitution. Relying on
Metro, the court stated that its standard of review
would be intermediate scrutiny: whether the classifi-
cation serves important governmental objectives and
whether the discriminatory means are substantially
related to those objectives.
Turning to the supporting statistical evidence, the
majority (over a sharp dissent by C.J. Mikva) held
that the FCC's evidence failed to show a correlation
between female ownership and the stated goal of the
FCC-diversity of programming. The majority drew
a distinction between the data that supports race and
ethnic classifications, where the data was conclusive,
but found the data supporting the gender classifica-
tion unconvincing.
The majority did leave the door open for further
study and data collection to try to establish a link
between ownership by women and programming di-
versity, but for the present, the FCC's policy violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The court remanded the case to the FCC for
reconsideration of the building permit without use of
the gender classification preference.
Sarasota-Charlotte Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 976
F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Where an applicant applies the term "general
manager" to a certain individual in an equal em-
ployment opportunity ("EEO") statement to the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), was
such a use conclusive for purposes of determining
whether the applicant has also thus submitted an in-
tegration proposal.
Holding-
The FCC's peremptory rejection of Sarasota-
Charlotte Broadcasting Corporation's ("SCBC") in-
tegration proposal was arbitrary and capricious. The
legitimacy of the FCC's policy of strictly disallowing
post cut-off date changes in an applicant's compara-
tive showing was not questioned, but the FCC could
not arbitrarily call a submission a "variance" where
the applicant did not voluntarily set forth any part of
its integration proposal in submitting an EEO
statement.
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Discussion:
Applicant-already operating an existing AM sta-
tion-applied for a new FM radio station license,
including in its application the requisite statement
outlining the applicant's EEO program. The state-
ment referred to the "general manager" of the AM
station as the head of the EEO program. The appli-
cant submitted its integration proposal after the B
cut-off date, which named another individual as the
proposed FM station general manager, who would
manage and supervise the overall operation of the
station for purposes of the integration proposal. The
administrative law judge ("ALJ") rejected SCBC's
integration proposal as an untimely variance from its
application, considering the EEO statement to have
set out SCBC's integration proposal by listing an in-
dividual as "general manager." The ALJ granted
the application of a competitor. The Review Board
and the FCC affirmed the ALJ's decision.
The court found no tenable basis for the FCC's
assertion that SCBC voluntarily submitted part of its
integration proposal with its application. Under ei-
ther of two possible readings of the applicant's EEO
statement, the court found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statement did not deal with integra-
tion. The submission was solely a statement of the
proposed station's EEO program, and contained
nothing that could be read as part of an integration
proposal.
WIRELESS SERVICES ISSUES
Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 829 P.2d 1286
(Colo. 1992).
Issue:
Whether consumers of cable television services had
a legally protected or cognizable interest so as to give
them standing to file a discrimination suit against
Cablevision.
Holding
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that con-
sumers of cable television services could maintain an
action for damages under the Colorado Unfair Trade
Practices Act based on alleged price discrimination
by cable television service where the consumers could
show that they were injured as a result of the anti-
trust violation. The court also held that even though
the consumers were not primary line competitors,
they could bring suit to enforce a section of the Un-
fair Practices Act applicable to primary line compet-
itors where the injury asserted by consumers was a
result of price discrimination allegedly intended to
injure the primary line competitor.
Discussion:
The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, allegedly including 45,000
households, brought a class action suit against
Cablevision. They contended that Cablevision had
consistently charged higher prices to subscribers in
areas where it faced no competition than in the area
where it faced competition. The plaintiffs alleged
that as a result of the discriminatory pricing, they
had overpaid for the cable television service.
Plaintiffs sought relief under the state Unfair
Trade Practices Act. Cablevision asserted first that
the Act provides protection only to competitors, not
to consumers, and second that an overcharge is not a
legally cognizable injury under the statute.
The court stated that the standing issue turned on
whether the subscribers had a legally protected or
cognizable interest. The court concluded that because
a competitor's act of subsidizing a price war through
overcharges in other markets is so intimately tied to
the unfair practice that the Act seeks to prevent, the
payment of such overcharges is a type of injury that
the statute was designed to prevent. Therefore, the
subscribers did have standing and had alleged a le-
gally cognizable injury under the statute.
Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350 (9th
Cir. 1992).
Issue.
Whether a city ordinance, which regulates the in-
stallation of satellite antennas so as not to unreason-
ably interfere with the City's land use regulations
and public safety concerns, was preempted by an
FCC regulation and/or was prohibited by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Holding
The court upheld the city ordinance, finding that
it furthered a substantial governmental interest in
public safety and aesthetic values and that it did not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.
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Discussion:
Plaintiffs, Wayne and Judie Johnson, argued that
while the satellite dish admittedly does not conform
to the ordinance, it nonetheless was protected by 47
C.F.R. §25.104 and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The City contended, however, that its
ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation that is permissible under the Constitution,
and that the FCC regulation did not preempt the
city ordinance, and thus the city was not prohibited
from enforcing its land use regulations in this case.
The court affirmed the district court's granting of
partial summary judgment to the city which denied
the Johnson's relief on their constitutional claim.
The court upheld the city ordinance, finding that it
furthered a substantial governmental interest in pub-
lic safety and aesthetic values and that it did not un-
reasonably limit alternative avenues of communica-
tion. The court, however, reversed the district court's
decision to uphold the Johnsons' federal preemption
claim. The court determined that it was error for the
district court to exclude the city's evidence coun-
tering the Johnsons' assertion that the city ordinance
prevents or imposes unreasonable limitations on sat-
ellite signal reception or imposes disproportionate
costs on satellite antenna users and was thus incon-
sistent with the federal regulation. The court re-
manded the case to resolve the federal preemption
issue.
Neufeld v. City of Baltimore, 964 F.2d 347 (4th Cir.
1992).
Issue:
Whether it was proper for a U.S. District Court
to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in a case
involving the preemption of satellite dish ordinances.
Holding-
The district court acted improperly when it re-
fused to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter involv-
ing local zoning restrictions on home satellite dishes.
Discussion:
In October 1985, the City of Baltimore, Maryland
fined Leon Neufeld, a homeowner, for violating the
city's zoning ordinances governing the size of pri-
vately owned satellite television dishes. Neufeld sub-
sequently filed a complaint in U.S. District Court
that argued, in effect, that Baltimore's zoning ordi-
nance was preempted by Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") regulations, and that enforce-
ment of the ordinance violated his First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights. The district court dis-
missed the action under the Burford doctrine.
Neufeld appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether the district court properly abstained on the
basis of Burford. Under Burford, a federal court
may refrain from exercising its judgment in a case if
that case involves either difficult questions of state
law or a municipality's eminent domain power. Ap-
plying the Burford doctrine to the case at hand, the
appellate court concluded that the district court had
erred in abstaining because the lower court had not
had before it difficult questions of state law involving
local concerns. Moreover, the court determined that
"exercising federal jurisdiction would not have dis-
rupted a coherent state policy by subjecting the pro-
visions of the zoning ordinance to varying
interpretations."
Consequently, the court of appeals reversed and
remanded the case to the district court for considera-
tion on the merits.
San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
967 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1992).
Issue:.
Whether a "periodic fee" imposed on a private
cellular telephone service firm, but not on a govern-
ment owned cellular telephone service firm, was a
"regulatory fee" or a tax for federal tax injunction
purposes.
Holding
The court held the "periodic fee" was a regulatory
fee and not a tax, and thus the Butler Act (Tax In-
junction Act) did not prohibit the federal court from
granting the private firm's declaratory relief.
Discussion:
The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") licensed two companies (a private firm and
a government-owned firm) to provide cellular tele-
phone service in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The Puerto
Rico Public Commission granted the private firm its
necessary authorization to operate, but the private
firm had to pay a 3 percent "periodic fee" while the
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government-owned firm did not have to pay this fee.
The private firm challenged the fee in federal court
as being unlawful. The court granted the private
firm's declaratory relief because it found that federal
statutes and FCC regulations preempt the local gov-
ernment's authority to impose that discriminatory
charge.
The Puerto Rico Commission argued that the fed-
eral court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
the Butler Act prohibits federal district courts from
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
imposed by the laws of Puerto Rico. The appeals
court held that the "periodic fee" was a regulatory
fee and not a tax for three reasons: (1) a regulatory
agency assessed the fee, (2) the agency placed the
money in a special fund, and (3) the money was not
used for a general purpose but rather to defray the
expenses generated in specialized investigations and
studies, for the hiring of professional and expert ser-
vices and the acquisition of the equipment needed for
the operations provided by law for the Commission.
Those three items, taken together, placed the 3 per-
cent fee at the regulatory fee end of the spectrum
and thus were not a tax.
United States v. Lande, 968 F.2d 907 (9th Cir.
1992).
Issue:
Whether conviction for selling unauthorized home
satellite descrambler units was appropriate under
Electronic Communications Privacy Act versus sec-
tion 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.
Holding-
Prosecutor may determine which statute to apply
as defendant's action qualified for application of ei-
ther statute.
Discussion:
Convicted under Title 18, sections 2510-2521 of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA"), for modifying General Instruments
Videocipher II descrambling units, which allow
home satellite viewers to receive unscrambled pay
television signals, the defendant appealed, arguing
that language in those sections did not encompass
satellite television signals which are directly ad-
dressed by the Communications Act, Title 47, section
605 (prohibiting the unauthorized publication or use
of publications). Rejecting the reasoning of the Elev-
enth Circuit, the court affirmed a lower decision
holding that defendant's actions amounted to "inten-
tional interception" of an "electronic communica-
tion" by a device "primarily useful for the purpose
of surreptitious interception." While both statutes
applied to defendant's conduct, it was for the prose-
cution to determine which statute to utilize.
United States v. Duane Dale Davis, 978 F.2d 415,
(8th Cir. 1992).
Issue:
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) applied to the
interception of commercial satellite programming,
and whether defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2512 (1)(b) was improper.
Holding-
The circuit court affirmed the district court's con-
viction of defendant Davis and concluded that the
use of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 and 2512 was proper.
Discussion:
Davis appealed the district court ruling arguing
that his conduct was outside the scope 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511 and 2512. In United States v. Hux, a panel
of this court held that the manufacture of a satellite
descrambler was not a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2512(1)(b). The court overruled Hux in this re-
spect by affirming Davis' conviction.
Davis argued that section 2511(1)(a), which
makes it unlawful for any person to intentionally in-
tercept electronic communications, is inapplicable to
the interception of commercial satellite program-
ming. The court held that had Congress wanted to
exempt all satellite programming from the reach of
the Wiretap Act, it would have been unnecessary to
include in the Wiretap Act narrower exclusions.
Davis also argued that his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) was improper because the de-
vices contemplated by that section are devices pri-
marily useful for "surreptitious interception." The
court found that Davis' modifications of VCII de-
vices made it possible for the device to descramble
and decrypt satellite programming without the
knowledge of the cable companies. The modifications
also made it nearly impossible to use the device for
any legitimate purpose. Therefore, individuals pos-
sessing those modified devices were required to use
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them in the most surreptitious manner.
Finally, the court found that Davis can be prose-
cuted under both the Wiretap Act and the Commu-
nications Act of 1934. "When two statutes prohibit
the same conduct, the Government may prosecute
under either statute or simultaneously prosecute
under both statutes as long as it does not discrimi-
nate against any class of defendants."
United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.
1992).
Issue-
Whether interception of conversation without
prior judicial approval over a cordless telephone vio-
lated Title VIII of the Omnibus Crime and Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2521.
Holding.
Title VIII only prohibits nonconsensual intercep-
tion of wire, oral, and electronic communication
without prior judicial approval.
Discussion:
Mr. Smith and Mr. Varing were next door
neighbors. Mr. Varing believed Mr. Smith was re-
sponsible for some recent break-ins at his house. Mr.
Varing used a Bearcat scanner to listen in on Mr.
Smith's conversations on a cordless telephone. Mr.
Varing discovered that Mr. Smith was involved in
drug dealing. Mr. Smith informed the police, who
instructed him to record Smith's calls and even sup-
plied some blank tapes. Those recordings led to the
arrest of Smith and four other defendants.
Smith argued that his recorded conversations over
the cordless telephone were inadmissible under Title
VIII. Title VIII prohibits the nonconsensual inter-
ception of wire, oral and electronic communication.
The definitions for wire and electronic communica-
tion do not include the radio portion of a cordless
telephone communication that is transmitted between
the cordless telephone handset and the base unit.
Smith argued that his conversation fit under the term
''oral communication," but the court held this term
only applies to any oral communication uttered by a
person and not a radio signal produced by the cor-
dless phone. The court held that Title VIII does not
apply to cordless phone communications.
United States v. Splawn, 982 F.2d 414 (10th Cir.
1992).
Issue.
Whether certain descrambling devices could have
any other purpose than "surreptitious interception"
of electronic communications.
Holding:
The court held that cloned satellite television
descramblers are designed in such a manner so as to
make them primarily useful for the surreptitious in-
terception of electronic communications, and are
therefore prohibited under the plain language of 18
U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b).
Discussion:
Defendant Splawn was indicted on nineteen
counts of assembling, possessing and selling a sur-
reptitious interception device in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b). Defendant had cloned com-
puter chips and inserted them into descrambling de-
vices, subsequently selling the devices which enabled
satellite television viewers to receive the signals from
premium cable channels without paying the required
subscription fee. Defendant entered a plea of guilty,
reserving for appeal the issue of whether his conduct
was properly charged under §2512(1)(b). Relying on
McNutt, the panel affirmed Splawn's convictions.
In United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561 (10th
Cir. 1990), a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
held that a cloned satellite television descrambling
device, which enabled satellite television viewers to
receive premium channel broadcasts without paying
the required subscription fees, fell within the crimi-
nal prohibition on surreptitious interception devices
of 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b). Subsequent to McNutt,
the Eight and Eleventh Circuits reached the opposite
conclusion. Although these decisions were subse-
quently overruled or vacated, the Court had previ-
ously granted Splawn's request for an en banc re-
hearing to reconsider McNutt in light of the
Eleventh Circuit's contrary opinion. Reviewing the
issue de novo, the court held that McNutt was cor-
rectly decided and affirmed Splawn's convictions.
The court noted that the point of interpretation
with which the Eleventh Circuit had disagreed was
the question whether the devices at issue are
designed primarily for the purpose of surreptitious
interception of electronic communications. The court
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stated that it had "no doubt that, for a device to be
prohibited under §2512(I)(b), its design must render
it primarily useful for the purpose of the surrepti-
tious interception of wire, oral or electronic commu-
nications." However, the court stated that it could
not agree with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that
the fact that cloned television descramblers are iden-
tical to legitimate descramblers, does not make
cloned descramblers primarily useful for the surrep-
titious interception of electronic communications.
The court stated that while descramblers, legiti-
mate or otherwise may be necessary to receive satel-
lite television transmissions for which no authoriza-
tion is necessary, the devices at issue are modified
descramblers, and the sole purpose of the modifica-
tion is to permit the surreptitious interception of sat-
ellite television transmissions. Accordingly, cloned
satellite television descramblers, such as those assem-
bled and possessed by Splawn, are designed in such
a manner so as to make them primarily useful for
the surreptitious interception of electronic communi-
cations, and are therefore prohibited under the plain
language of § 2512(1)(b).
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